

IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY & POLITICS ON TERRORISM AND FARMERS/HERDERS CLASH IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT:

This paper is an analysis of the trend of insurgent attacks in Nigeria by the Boko Haram terrorist group and the Fulani extremists. The two groups were used as case studies because their modus operandi is quite similar. The information that formed the basis of this presentation is completely doctrinal as sourced from academic textbooks, journals, and online news publications. The research found that thousands of fatalities have been recorded as a result of the incessant attacks by the two groups. Going forward, it established the historical perspective that led to the emergence of the groups with emphasis on the attacks perpetrated by the groups from 2014 to 2018. Recommendations were made based on the outcome of the research to aid policymakers in making effective policies for the security and safety of all Nigerians.

KEYWORDS: Boko Haram, Fulani herders, Farmers, Conflict, Insurgency, and Insecurity.

INTRODUCTION

Different decades in Nigeria are renowned for peculiar security challenges. For instance, in the 70s to early 2000, there was a sense of safety and security among the Nigerian people with cases of petty theft, burglary and sometimes armed robbery being the most reported crimes. Armed robbery at those times was a national security threat, though the crime was peculiar to a few states in the country.

Doctor Ishola Oyenusi, for instance, set a record for being the first known armed robber in Nigeria. He was very cold-blooded and held sway in the 70s after the Nigerian civil war with his activities prominent in the Western region. Lawrence Nomanyagbon Anini who is also known as the "Law" was popular for spearheading the four-month reign of terror in the old Bendel state and on record as the most notorious armed robber of Nigerian origin. There was also the case of Okwudili Ndiwe who is also known as Derico Nwamama who unleashed unprecedented terror on the people of Anambra state from the late 90s to 2001 before his eventual capture and decapitation by the dreaded Bakassi-Boys vigilante group (Dachen, 2018).

During the periods mentioned above armed robbery was the only security problem in Nigeria that was considered major. Today, the country is grappling with arrays of security challenges from the Boko Haram insurgency to farmers/herders clash to kidnapping, and to armed robbery et al. These challenges have not just distorted security operations among security agencies it has also been responsible for the channeling of scarce resources for security management with little to show for the increased security budget. This paper acknowledges the fact that Nigeria is faced with wanton security challenges, however the thrust is on the analysis of the activities of Boko Haram Islamist sect and farmers/herders clashes.

Unfortunately, as the herders/farmers conflict continue to grow stronger, some persons have insisted that President Buhari is aiding and abetting the herders; according to Agbo (2018) the President is a Fulani and a Sunni Muslim; he advocates the cattle colonies; the crisis escalated in his Presidency, there are no records of arrests, prosecution, and sentencing of offenders; he may pass as a herder since he owns cattle; cases of delay in the deployment of security to crises areas by his security chiefs who are northerners and Sunnis' as was seen in the 2016 massacre of 800 indigent of Southern Kaduna and 200 persons in Plateau state in June 2018 among other allegations may justify these claims.

In the US Congress, there was the need for President Buhari to publicly condemn the killing of Christians by herders as he was accused of being indifferent with his inactions (Odunsi, 2018). Wole Soyinka had enjoined the President to put an end to the ethnic cleansing by giving a nationwide order to all land usurpers (Vanguard Online News, 2018). In June 2018, Punch Newspaper reported that the UN chief scribe Antonio Guterres has expressed concern over farmers/herder conflict across the West African sub-region with emphasis on the attacks in Nigeria's Plateau state where over 80 villagers lost their lives. For Amnesty International, the government's impunity is fueling insecurity with its lack of will to bringing the perpetrators to account for their crimes.

The President insists that he is being accused falsely while asking the media to be fair and balanced in their

reportage of security issues in Nigeria (Channels Television June 27th, 2018 News) As far as the President is concerned, the killings and incessant bloodshed are sponsored by disgruntled politicians who have lost out politically (Tukur, 2018). Nwangwu, Ononogbu, & Okoye (2016) in a similar vein opined that the Publicity Secretary of the People's Democratic Party Olisah Metuh also traded blame for the escalating insurgency in the country when he said:

We accept the reality of terrorism as a global phenomenon. However, the peculiar trend of the Nigerian version which subsists on a welter of nebulous demands and masked identities...defies all reason and logic and only summarizes a well-considered agenda of national destabilization for a purely selfish political cause. (p.42)

Away from the blame games, the death of defenseless Nigerians is recorded on a daily basis in their numbers across the states of Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Taraba, Borno, Kogi, Zamfara, and some parts of southern Nigeria states of Enugu, Edo, Delta, and Ebonyi et al. According to ThisDay Online News as reported by Akinloye (2018), The United States Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) says it has documented at least 19,890 deaths in Nigeria since June 2015. This is as the United Kingdom-based Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) disclosed that Fulani militias killed 1,061 people in about 106 attacks on communities in central Nigeria in the first quarter of 2018. CSW said 11 other attacks on communities in the southern parts of the country by the militia claimed 21 more lives. The UK House of Lords has expressed concerns about the Nigerian government's failure to put an end to the killings in Nigeria in its debate over the killing of about 200 persons in Plateau state warning that the situation may degenerate to the Rwandan kind of genocide if the government fails to act accordingly. The CFR, however, puts the cumulative deaths in Nigeria at 53, 595 from 2011 to 2018. This is an alarming statistic given the fact that Nigeria is not in a civil war situation.

Conceptual And Theoretical Framework

Conflict can be viewed as an opportunity and motivation for change (Basky, 2015 p. 3). The way people will handle conflict depend greatly on their perception of the conflict and the end product of their rationalization. In other words, people respond to conflict differently, i.e., litigation, collaboration, fighting et al (Coltri, 2010, p. 46). Competitive conflicts will always tend to escalate the disputants' hostility and as it escalates, it pressures bystanders to form alliances with disputants thereby increasing the number of partisanship. While some

responses can be helpful, others can be counterproductive. When two or more parties have differences in position, beliefs, value system, or interest, whether the divergence is real or perceived; there is said to be a "social conflict" (Coltri, 2010, p. 47).

Over time, the word "terrorism" which came into existence during the French Revolution, when terrorism simply meant the mass guillotining of the aristocracy and other perceived enemies of the state has changed (Nacob, 2012, p. 19) Then the state kept its citizens under control by unleashing terror on them with the aim of taking away their voices and keeping them cooperative against their will. Today, this meaning has expanded to include violence against those in power and other defenseless citizens. According to Richard E. Rubenstein as cited by (Nacob, 2012);

Descriptively "terrorism" suggests violent action by individuals or small groups. Judgmentally, it implies illegitimacy. These meanings are closely related since there are very few situations in which assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, or bank robberies seem justified. By contrast, wars and revolutions are frequently considered not only justified, but holy (p. 20).

The scholarly analysis of the **morality** of terrorism has produced a wide range of observations. For example, Walter describes terror as an emotional state caused by specific acts or threats of violence, and terrorism as a compound of three elements: the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction, and the social effects. In 1934, Hardman referred to terrorism as activities involving a systematic use of violence, but somehow sought to distinguish between mass violence and the terrorist method (Poland, 2011, p. 4). Moore described violence and terrorism as "negative compulsions" and stated there is an analogous relationship between violence and terrorism. Rapoport, on the other hand, views terrorists and terrorism as involving individuals unconstrained by "moral limits" and acts of violence designed to cause extreme injury (Poland, 2011, p. 5).

This research explored three distinct theories in explaining the heightened insurgency in Nigeria. The first relates to the Boko Haram terrorist group while the last two explains the conflict between farmers and herders.

Religion as the political philosophy of terrorism: Abbasi & Khatwani (2014, p. 105), were of the opinion that Criminologists world over have come to agree that most of the very dangerous terrorist organizations in the world are motivated by religious doctrines. Under

religion as the political philosophy of terrorism, terrorist tend to consider their religion as universal and feel they are obligated to propagate their religion by means of violence if need be. Their adoption of violence has often been justified and legitimized because they believe their cause is part of God's plan. This theory played out in the recent back to back, killing of two humanitarian workers in September and October 2018. Saifura Hussaini and Hauwa Liman, who worked for the UNICEF and ICRC respectively before their abduction by the Islamic State of West Africa Province at a military facility in Rann Borno state in March 2018. Here is a part of the statement released by the sect in justification of the act:

...Saifura and Hauwa were killed because they are considered as Murtads (apostates) by the group because they were once Muslims that have abandoned their Islam, the moment they chose to work with the Red Cross, and for us, there is no difference between Red Cross and UNICEF (Sahara Reporters, 2018).

Theory of the Tragedy of the Commons: this theory states that it is natural for groups to want to exploit to the fullest resources that are collectively owned. One group tends to ignore the general interest of all other groups (s) by resorting to overusing and ultimately destroying a resource that is collectively owned. The theory as postulated by Hardin (1968) explained the 'tragedy' by using the example of a pasture which is open to all to use. This open pasture is used by herdsmen to allow their cattle to graze and each herdsman will continue to add cattle to the pasture so as to expand the number of proceeds coming from their herd. As the resources become scarcer, competition and conflict over them will increase (Audu, 2013, p. 27).

The neo-Malthusian Theory: this is another theory that explains the reason for the conflict between Nigeria herders and farmers. These theorists predicted that a time would come when population explosion will put pressure on the few available resources leading to increased hunger and violence (Audu, 2013, p. 27). Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998) who is the progenitor of this theory used three hypotheses to link environmental changes to violent conflict. First, he suggested that decreasing supply of physical controllable environmental resources, such as clean water and good agricultural land, would provoke conflicts. The second hypothesis stated that large population movements caused by environmental stress would induce "group-identity" conflicts, especially ethnic clashes. The third hypothesis suggested that severe environmental scarcity would simultaneously increase

economic deprivation and disrupt key social institutions, which in turn would cause "deprivation" conflicts such as civil strife and insurgency (Audu, 2013, p. 28).

LITERATURE REVIEW:

Boko Haram Terrorist Group: Before the inception of Boko Haram insurgency, Nigerians never knew that a day would come when they would all become vulnerable to attacks by suicide bombers and other forms of terrorist attacks. These kinds of attacks have since become a commonplace in Nigeria (United States Military Academy, 2018). Comolli (2015, p. 112) stated that having previously established relations with al-Qaeda affiliates, Boko Haram is the latest and most prominent group to have sworn allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), rebranding itself Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Nigeria as the giant of Africa is renowned for the various successful peacekeeping missions it has undertaken in the West African sub-region and beyond, nevertheless, that title has been watered down with the consistent attacks by Boko Haram making it difficult for Nigeria to guarantee the security of its neighbors in the Lake Chad basin. It is believed that Al-Qaeda's early support for Boko Haram emanated from its interest in seeing that Nigeria stopped playing its leadership role for the "Jewish-Crusader Alliance.

According to the Assessment Capacities Project Report of 2015, 9,000,000 and 24, 500, 000 persons have been affected directly and indirectly by Boko Haram attacks. In 2015, 4, 600, 000 persons were in need of humanitarian intervention as against the 7,700,000 in 2018 (Iyekekpolo, 2016, p. 1-2). While Nigeria had 1,538,982 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2015; the number increased with over 500% with 7,700,000 persons displaced within the states of northeastern Nigeria in 2016 (ACAPS, No date). It is a known fact that Boko Haram attacks brought divisive tendencies among Nigerians in its early years of operation. In 1999, some states of northern Nigeria with Zamfara state at the forefront decided to operationalize the Sharia law within their territories. Sharia is Arabic for "drinking place" or a "path that leads to a watering hole." At the time the wave of sharia law was sweeping across the northern states of Nigeria, other non-Muslims misunderstood the ideology while some likened it to a strategy aimed at Islamising Nigeria, others were of the view that some Muslim northerners are bent on making the country ungovernable for the then Christian President Olusegun Obasanjo. This kind of varying public perception was expected given that Nigeria is a multi-religious country

where certain actions need to be disseminated in the language that everyone understands to avoid resultant conflicts. Governor Ahmed Sani Yerima was right when he asserted that the Nigerian constitution empowered its federating units to enact religious laws (Oraegbunam, No date).

So how does the Sharia law relate to Boko Haram insurgency? When the first phase of Boko Haram attacks started in 2009, places of Christian worship were the sect's favorite targets. This led to many Nigerians insisting that Boko Haram attacks were a means of taking the Sharia law a step further since it abhors westernization and all other teachings that are not based on the Quran. For instance, the December 2010 twin bombing of Anguwan and Gadabiyu areas of Jos made these claims plausible since the attacks were targeted at churches and Christian settlements (Omomia, 2015, p. 62). There were lots of hostility among Christians and Muslims predicated on the ignorance that Muslims are "terrorists."

According to Aghedo & Osumah (2012, p. 858), the origin of Boko Haram, however, is said to be as controversial as its demands and perhaps grievances. It was originally known as the Ahlusuna Wai'jama ah hijra in the 90s and later on nicknamed the Nigerian Taliban and Yusufiyah sect. Boko Haram is a phrase derived from a combination of Hausa and Arabic words. While Boko is Hausa for "Book", Haram is Arabic for "unlawful", hence the meaning "western education is forbidden" (Osisanwo, 2016 p. 342). For the sect, the Rule of Law, Democracy, Constitutionalism, secularism, and all non-Arabic schools are sinful and must be abhorred because they are predicated on man-made laws. For the insurgent group, corruption and moral decadence are a product of "western education" (Sahara Reporters, 2014). The sect has not wavered in preaching the ideology it holds dear over the years, but it has obviously been very dynamic with its strategies and tactics as it continues to keep tab with other International terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In 2002, the group Boko Haram was officially established by Yusuf with the goal of establishing Sharia law in the northeast state of Borno. His religious complex included a mosque and a school opened to pupils from poor families from within the state and other neighboring countries in the Lake Chad Basin (Okemi, 2013, p. 3). The increasing radicalization of the group and the extra-judicial execution of Yusuf led to a series of violent uprising across many northern Nigeria states in 2009. One thing is certain, the sect has factions, but the number of factions is not precise with the Abubakar Shekau led faction and the Abu Musab al-Barnawi faction being at constant loggerhead as to whom the authentic leader of the group is (Segun, 2018, p. 86)

As the country fought the insurgent group, the group got even stronger making it the top five deadliest terrorist groups in the world for five consecutive years and the deadliest in 2014 when it overtook ISIS with a 317% increase in the death rate caused by the group. That was as reported by 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Global Terrorism Index. Though the GTI 2016 report was indicative that there was a 10% reduction in terrorists' related deaths due to the weakened Boko Haram and ISIS the drop however, didn't impact Nigeria positively. Nigeria nonetheless recorded the greatest decline in death from terrorist attacks in 2016 as it retained its top five spots of countries most impacted by terrorism.

In 2018, Boko Haram became extremely ferocious three years after President Buhari said in a BBC interview that technically, the war on terror in Nigeria has been won (BBC, 2015). The sect has been consistent in unleashing mayhem on Nigerians with a number of unquantifiable attacks. In other words, the onslaught by the militant group happens multiple times on a monthly basis as a day hardly passes without the record of an incidence by the sect. Some of the attacks from 2014 to 2018 as sourced from CNN (2018), The Guardian (2018), Toromade (2017), and Sahara reporters (2014 & 2018) are compiled in table 1.1 below.

Boko Haram Attacks and Fatalities from 2014 to 2018

S/No	Year/Date	Description
	2014	
1	Jan. 24	45 persons killed in the militants' attacks at the Kawuri market in Borno.
2	Apr. 14	276 girls abducted from a boarding facility in a Chibok secondary school in Borno state.
3	May. 20	118 persons killed in a twin bomb explosion in Jos market.
4	Jun. 3-4	About 500 persons killed in different Borno Villages.
5	Jun. 7-8	The sect kidnapped 20 women in Garkin Fulani village of Borno state.
6	Jun .18-22	Boko Haram killed 30 men and abducted 60 women & children after holding the village of Kumma hostage for four days.
7	Jul. 17-20	15,000 persons fled Damboa town with about 60 others killed in Boko Haram raid.
	2015	
8	Jan. 3	A multiple raids of Baga town in Maiduguri led to the killing of about 2000 persons with dead bodies scattered everywhere.
9	Mar. 2	The sect released video of the decapitation of two men suspected to be spies.
10	Jul. 1	Boko Haram raiding of three Borno villages led to the killing of 145 persons
	2016	
11	Feb.	58 persons in refugee camp killed by two suicide bombers while 30 other persons were murdered in the sect's raid of three different villages.
	2017	
12	Jan. 7	5 soldiers killed in a military base in Yobe state.
13	Jan. 13	An attack of the 119 Battalion & 133 Special Forces Battalion led to the death of 3 soldiers.
14	Jan. 16	The sect murdered Professor Aliyu alongside 3 others when a suicide bomber attacked the premises of the University of Maiduguri.
15	Jan. 23	8 persons killed and an unidentifiable number of women kidnapped in an attack at Dzaku community of Askira-Ubah LGA of Borno state.
16	Feb. 10	7 Soldiers died in Dikwa in a Boko Haram ambush.
17	Feb. 13	An Islamic scholar in Mija community murdered by the terrorist group.
18	Mar. 14	The sect released the video of the execution of 3 men suspected to be spies for the Nigerian Army.
19	Mar. 15	Magunmeri community was attacked and 7 persons were confirmed dead.
20	Mar. 16	4 Soldiers killed when the sect attacked the military and a police station.
21	Mar. 25	18 girls and 4 women were kidnapped from Pulka village in Gwoza.
22	Apr. 5	360 heads of livestock stolen with the killing of 7 men in a farming community in the outskirts of Maiduguri.
23	May. 13	Two suicide bombers died alongside a security guard in UNIMAID.
24	Jun. 18	An explosive kills 12 persons Kofa village.
25	Jun. 20	3 persons killed & 16 women kidnapped when a police convoy was ambushed along Maiduguri-Biu road.
26	Jul.	3 University of Maiduguri lecturers on exploration mission were kidnapped.
27	Jul. 28	80 persons killed and many others injured when the sect attacked an IDP camp in Dikwa.
28	Aug. 1	7 persons died in Mildu village attack in Adamawa state.
29	Aug.	31 Fishermen killed in Lake Chad.
30	Aug. 15	A suicide bomber killed 16 persons in Konduga market.

	2018	
31	Feb. 16	17 persons killed & scores injured in a suicide bomber attack of Konduga
32	Feb. 19	A faction of Boko Haram kidnapped 110 girls from a government boarding school in Dapchi Yobe state.
33	Mar. 1	The 3 rd Battalion of Nigeria Military base was attacked by the sect leading to the death of 3 humanitarian workers from UNICEF & IOM while 2 ICRC personnel & 1 UNICEF personnel were abducted.
34	Mar. 5	2 farmers killed in Gudda village of Mafa LGA of Borno state.
35	Apr. 22	18 forest workers collecting firewood in a Borno bush were murdered
36	May 1	86 persons killed in a suicide attack in market & mosque attacks in Mubi Adamawa state.
37	Jun. 16	43 persons died when a suicide bomber detonated an explosive in a community in Damboa.
38	Jun. 8	9 Soldiers murdered by the sect in Gajiram in Borno state.
39	Jul. 14	Dozens of Nigerian soldiers murdered in an attack of the military base in Jilli.
40	Sep. 30	30 soldiers killed when the sect attacked a military base along the Nigerien border.

Farmers/Herders Conflict: With farmers and herders' conflict in Nigeria, one thing is clear and that is the fact that many Nigerians are yet to realize that not all Fulani's are herders and not all herders are Fulani's. Again while some herders have resorted to criminality; others are nothing but innocent herders who go about their activities with their sticks and water bottles. It is estimated that 50% of Nigerian pastoralists are semi-nomadic that send out their cattle to areas of greener pastures in dry seasons and have them return to their base in the rainy season. 30% of these pastoralists are fully settled and only 20% of them are 100% nomads; these nomadic groups are constantly moving in response to the availability of pasture and cannot be linked to any specific address (Abdullahi, Daneyed, & Aliyara, 2015, p. 138).

Fulani herders engage in seasonal migration because they have to feed their cattle. Available records show that death from herders' attacks hit an outrageous 60,000 from 2010 to 2016. While some peace builders say that deaths and attacks of Fulani's are often not reported because the group is not just under-represented and nomadic in its operations, the illiteracy level of many of them has become a fundamental factor. However, the fact that Fulani extremist were responsible for more deaths in Nigeria in 2016 than the Boko Haram extremists calls for concern (GTI, 2017).

Farmers depend on the cultivation of land for sustenance while herders keep their cattle sustain by grazing them on fertile lands capable of producing the resources that keep the cattle refreshed. The farmers that

clash frequently with herders are emphatic that the herders deliberately allow their cattle graze on their plants/plantation. The conflict here emanates from the need for land as an economic resource. Nonetheless, the government says the hostility on the part of killer herdsmen is as a result of shrinking grazing land caused by desertification and population explosion. Other concerned Nigerians are asking the question of what makes the "Fulani Herders" special and why they should cede their ancestral lands to them (Punch Online News 6th June, 2018).

The headers are used to open grazing but some Nigerians have been advocating "ranching." So how does "ranching" differ from "open grazing?" Collins online dictionary defined ranching as the activity of running a large farm, especially one used for raising cattle, horses, or sheep. By this definition, cattle's are confined in a designated space year in year out with all their feeding needs made available within the space. Grazing, on the other hand, is the vegetation on pastures that are available for livestock to feed upon while a grazing reserve is a piece of land that the government acquires, develops, and releases to the pastoral Fulani. The essence of grazing reserves was to contain the conflict that could ensue between farmers and herders by getting and protecting pasture-space for the national herds and removing discords between agronomists and pastoralists living in the same geographic area (Iro, No Date).

The concept of grazing reserves dates back to the traditional grazing ground (Hurmi) in northern Nigeria. However, the Hurmi's available to Fulani herders and their

corresponding “Burtali” (cattle path) continued to shrink thanks to population explosion (Abdullahi et al., 2015) An attempt to change the scope of nomadism in Nigeria dates back to 1901 when a case of severe drought overwhelmed northern Nigeria. In 1954, the World Bank review of pastoralism in Nigeria led to three proposals aimed at improving the lots of the herders. The proposals are: that grazing reserves backed by law be established; the pastoralists be provided land rights, and the development of communal villages in grazing reserves for the purpose of coopting livestock's into peasant agriculture (Abdullahi et al., 2015).

Eleven years after the proposal by the World Bank, the “Grazing Reserve Law of Northern Nigeria” was enacted in 1964. The law authorized the Ministry of Animal and Forest Resource and other native authorities to acquire, preserve, control and manage grazing resources (Babalobi, 2016) These efforts did not improve the security outlook of Nigeria as Fulani extremists continued to unleash terror on Nigerians. According to 2017 GTI, Fulani extremists were responsible for 466 terrorist attacks that led to 3068 fatalities in four countries but the disturbing aspect of this report is that 92% of these fatalities took place in Nigeria in the midst of confusion as to whether there are communications and coordination among the Fulani attackers (GTI, 2017).

The conflicts between farmers and herders have not improved over the years. In June 2018, 86 persons were killed in an attack on Barikin Ladi community in Plateau state. The attack was said to be a reprisal and “analysts believed it could become Nigeria’s biggest security concern eclipsing Boko Haram’s Islamist insurgency that has left at least 20,000 dead since 2009” (Africa, 2018). The massacre of Agatu raised concern in 2016 and 2017 because of the intensity of the attacks and fatalities. Nonetheless, Agatu was not the first community in the Food Basket of the Nation to be baptized with what many have referred to as the “baptism of fire” by herdsmen. A host of other Benue communities like Guma, Gwer-East, Buruku, and Gwer-West have come under heavy attackers by herders in multiple occasions from 2011 to 2014 (Mayah, 2016). Piecing together the bloody history of Agatu’s relationship with herdsmen, a 41-year old former police officer, Shaibu Ahmadu, told PREMIUM TIMES in the Otukpo IDP camp that:

the latest mass killing was the climax of an expansionist agenda that began years ago in Nassarawa State by the Fulanis. Earlier, communities like Tom-Anyiin, Tom-Ataan, Mbaya, and Tombu in Buruku Local Government Area of the state have fallen to the Fulanis.

The Fulani's, on the other hand, urged Nigerians never to buy the fake tails of Agatu travails insisting that the Agatus’s aren’t just the aggressors but that their tears are crocodile tears. According to the National Secretary of the Gan Allah Fulani Association Saleh Bayeri; Agatus’ triggered the conflict when they killed a prominent Fulani leader residing in its community in 2013. The Agatu and Tiv militia’s numbering over 20 were said to have carted away over 200 cows after killing Sehu Abdullahi. (Mayah, 2016). The herder's attack of Uzo-Uwani L.G.A of Enugu state in 2016 claimed the lives of fourteen persons when about seven villages in Nimbo - Nimbo Ngwoko, Ugwuijoro, Ekwuru, Ebor, Enugu Nimbo, Umuome, and Ugwuach came under attacks by the herders who were said to be over five hundred and heavily armed (Vanguard Online New April, 2016). This presentation cannot take detailed account of herders attacks since 2014 for want of space, but it is important to keep in mind that the conflict has been escalating with an estimated 180 persons killed in some Nigeria states in the first quarter of 2018 alone (Gbaradi, 2018). These and many more are some of the reasons why Senator Rabiw Musa Kwankwaso representing Kano Central District of Kano state in the Nigeria Senate sponsored the “National Grazing Reserves Bill with the aim of containing the incessant clashes across the country. The Bill, besides



Figure 1.1; Source: GTI (2017)




Figure 1.2; Source: GTI (2017)

seeking Grazing Routes & Reserves also seeks the establishment of a Commission that will enforce the Grazing law. The people of southern Nigeria had tagged the “Bill” an

anti-people bill because according to them, it is capable of enslaving and denying a section of Nigerians their ancestral lands (Babalobi, 2016).




Figure 1.3; Source: Gbaradi (2018)

DISCUSSIONS:

The analytical case study became necessary for three distinct purposes. First, the increased security budget in the present decade has not translated into security for Nigerians. Secondly, there has been misconceptions and misunderstanding about the conflict for resource control between the herders and farmers of Nigeria. Finally, the paper revealed that Boko Haram and Fulani extremists' attacks are capable of leading to more serious security challenges in Nigeria if nothing is done to restore the trust that once existed among the peoples of Nigeria. Some Nigerians are certain that the government is being biased towards them, hence not giving any attention to their safety and security. In a rare outburst, a former Chief of Army Staff and Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Yakubu Danjuma, in March 2018 raised an alarm that there was an attempt at ethnic cleansing in the country and asked Nigerians to rise up to resist it (ThisDay, 2018).

CONCLUSIONS:

It is a stark reality that safety and security have become one of the scarcest commodities in contemporary Nigeria. This presentation enumerated the fact that Nigerians and concerned members of the international community are genuinely worried about the continued unabated uprising that has led to wanton killings over the past four years. The research found that many of these attacks would have been mitigated if the security agencies

acted promptly on the intelligence available to them. This failure represents a general failure on the part of the government at all levels to protect the lives and properties of its citizens.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY ACTION:

Based on the findings from this study, the under-listed recommendations are a proposal to guide the policymakers in the Nigeria Criminal Justice System:

- 1. Effective Border Control Policy:** The concerns about the porosity of Nigerian borders are glaring. This challenge is peculiar to Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram is fully exploiting the inadequacies in border controls to criss-cross the four countries at will in search of safe havens (The Guardian, 2017). Recently the Nigerian Minister of Interior Gen. Abdulrahman Dambazau (retd.), revealed in a stakeholders' meeting that 70% of the 500 million small arms and light weapons in West Africa, translating to 350 million, are found in Nigeria (Vanguard, 2018) According to the Comptroller General of the Nigerian Customs Service, Col Hameed Ali (retd.), the security of Nigeria borders cannot be guaranteed since there are no clear-cut demarcation showing the end of Nigeria in relation to its neighbors at the borderlines (Ofikenua, 2016). The President, on the other hand, has said that the problem of herders/farmers clash has been there for long; but worsened because the arms

that Mr Gaddafi provided his supporters had filtered into Nigeria where they are now being used to fuel killings across the north-central states (Premium Times Online News April, 2018).

2. **Ranching for Pastoral Fulanis':** Though Miyetti Allah Kautel Hore which is the umbrella socio-cultural association of the Fulani tribe has insisted that "ranching" is not practical in today's Nigeria. For them, everything in Nigeria is still in its primitive stage so why the attempt to modernize pastoralism? (Godwin, 2017). Nonetheless, ranching has become imperative given the total population of Nigeria which was estimated to be at 190.9 in 2017. The population of Nigeria represents 2.35% of the world's total population which means that one person in every 43 people on the planet is a resident of Nigeria (Trading Economics, No date). Given this factor, any attempt to introduce the "grazing reserves" may be met with stiff resistance by other stakeholders in the Nigeria project because urbanization has shrunk to a great extent the flexibility nomads.
3. **Military Officers Welfare:** To the soldiers at the war front, the government has deliberately sent them on a suicide mission. They lack all it takes for minimal sustenance. Many said that their allowances have been slashed in the face of increasing cost of living while others claimed that they are owed arrears of several months in allowance. Another angle to the plight of Nigerian soldiers is that they have also had to endure hunger while some said that they have had to beg their enemies for water on several occasions because they were going to die of taste (The Cable, 2018). For others, however, the big men in Abuja are diverting monies meant for their welfare for their selfish gains. To prove to Nigerians that monies earmarked for the fight against insurgency are spent accordingly; the system of accounting for sums received and for what and why it is appropriated should be published on a quarterly basis with a feedback mechanism in place from all stakeholders.
4. **Intelligence gathering:** Intelligence is essential in countering terrorism, in diminishing its tactical effects and strategic importance. But without a comprehensive, intelligence and firm policy of all the governments and political leaders involved, terrorism will continue to present a real threat to future generations (Karmon, 2002). The criminal justice system serves as a source of reliable information concerning terrorist groups around the world. Nigeria has relegated this element to the background in its fight against insurgency. It is evident that a military combatant alone cannot give the country the desired victory hence, the need for a synergy in information gathering and sharing among Nigeria security agencies to be coordinated by the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA).
5. **Working with captors and Prosecuting Offenders:** This strategy has worked for the United States - it motivates suspects to disclose reliable details upon apprehension. In other to maximize the information gathered from any cooperator, the United States intelligence community leverages on the results of working closely with each other. For example, some members of the al-Qaeda terrorist group were sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States in 2001; thanks to the information gathered from an arrested suspect - L'Houssaine Kherchtou, who decided to cooperate with the US government concerning the details of the bombing of American Embassy in East Africa. John W. Lindh, Mohammed J. Baber, David Hadley, Adis Medunjanin, Adis Medunjanin, and a host of other terrorist pleaded guilty from 2002 to 2010 to accusations bordering on alleged attempts to blow up a passenger airplane, attempts to assassinate the President of the United States, and plans to bomb the office a Danish Newspaper. All the above-listed persons were given the incentives necessary to motivate them to disclose information to the United States authority. Other cooperators have continued to provide useful intelligence till date (The United States Department of Justice, 2010). This strategy will work wonders in Nigeria if adopted.
6. **Inclusive Leadership:** By this, the President of Nigeria is expected to be the President of all not a section of the country. Here is what S. 14 (3) CFRN (1999) says about this: The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to effect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies." Majority of Nigerians have decried the President's appointments that have shown to be dominated by one ethnic group especially the heads of security agencies. Many have insisted that the President is nothing short of a tribal leader keen at implementing the 97% and 5% received votes policy (Sahara Reporters, 2015). These actions and inactions have made Nigerians divided like never before with emerging conflicts as the end result.
7. **Religion:** Religion no doubt has a great role to play in improving the security situation of Nigeria. The era of social media has opened up the floodgates of information sharing especially ones that incite tribes and religions against each

other. While some of the information circulated are genuine, others are “false” and circulated by mischief makers with one objective – cause trouble and continue to keep Nigerians divide. There is the need to keeping

preaching peace, understanding, and tolerance among Nigerians. It will be more effective coming from the clergies since Nigeria is a very religious country with its citizens holding their clerics in high esteem.

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