

THE PRINCIPAL USE OF PROPOSITIONAL AND SUPPOSITIONAL TERMS IN THE SENTENCES

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ABSTRACT:

Cerebral palsy is a group of disorders that affect movement and muscle tone or posture. It's caused by damage that occurs to the immature brain as it develops, most often before birth. The following article looks into the development and symptoms of the diseases, identifies its causes and treatment and prevention procedures.

KEYWORDS: cerebral paralysis, proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence

INTRODUCTION:

In philosophy, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence, where "meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning. Equivalently, a proposition is the non-linguistic bearer of truth or falsity which makes any sentence that expresses it either true or false.

In mathematics the term proposition refers to a statement that may or may not be true, whilst the term axiom refers to a statement that is taken to be true within a domain of discourse.

While the term "proposition" may sometimes be used in everyday language to refer to a linguistic statement which can be either true or false, the technical philosophical term, which differs from the mathematical usage, refers exclusively to the non-linguistic meaning behind the statement. The term is often used very broadly and can also refer to various related concepts, both in the history of philosophy and in contemporary analytic philosophy. It can generally be used to refer to some or all of the following: The primary bearers of truth values (such as "true" and "false"); the objects of belief and other propositional attitudes (i.e. what is believed, doubted, etc.); the referents of "that"-clauses (e.g. "It is true that the sky is blue" and "I believe that the sky is blue" both involve the proposition the sky is blue); and the meanings of declarative sentences.

Since propositions are defined as the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity, this means that the term "proposition" does not refer to particular thoughts or particular utterances (which are not sharable across different instances), nor does it

refer to concrete events or facts (which cannot be false). Propositional logic deals primarily with propositions and logical relations between them.

MATERIALS AND METHODS:

Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic and statement logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements. In propositional logic, the simplest statements are considered as indivisible units, and hence, propositional logic does not study those logical properties and relations that depend upon parts of statements that are not themselves statements on their own, such as the subject and predicate of a statement. The most thoroughly researched branch of propositional logic is classical truth-functional propositional logic, which studies logical operators and connectives that are used to produce complex statements whose truth-value depends entirely on the truth-values of the simpler statements making them up, and in which it is assumed that every statement is either true or false and not both. However, there are other forms of propositional logic in which other truth-values are considered, or in which there is consideration of connectives that are used to produce statements whose truth-values depend not simply on the truth-values of the parts, but additional things such as their necessity, possibility or relatedness to one another.

DISCUSSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

Many are reluctant to accept the claim that co-referring proper names are intersubstitutable within the scope of attitude verbs, even when they are attracted to the thesis of direct reference and the idea that the contents of some of our attitudes are nothing but singular propositions. Thus, many neo-Russellians reject Naive Russellianism. They would like to accept the intuitions that (1) is true and (4) is false while denying the Fregean claims that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are not directly referential and that all cases of identity confusion are to be explained in terms of a difference in

thought grasped. They want it all. (5) and (6) express the same singular proposition, but (1) is true and (4) is false. While Naive Russellians claim that the information regarding how Lois believes what she does is, at best, merely part of what utterances of (1) and (4) pragmatically convey, “sophisticated” neo-Russellians would like that information to be part of the semantic content of the sentences in question. In this section we look at two broad strategies that promise to deliver these results: The first developed in Mark Cramming and John Perry and Crimmins and the second suggested by a view presented in Mark Richard.

Crimmins and Perry argue that propositional attitude reports involve “unarticulated constituents” that concern how the subject of the report conceives of the proposition that the report alleges that she has an attitude towards. According to Crimmins and Perry, a typical utterance of (1) expresses a truth while a typical utterance of (4) expresses a falsehood. Both attributions, they claim, say of Lois that she believes the singular proposition about Superman to the effect that he is strong. But the first involves implicit reference to Lois’s “Superman-y” way of thinking of Superman and the second to Lois’s “Clark Kent-y” way of thinking of Superman. Because Lois believes that singular proposition in the first way and not the second, the two sentences will typically express different propositions that can diverge in truth-value.

Crimmins and Perry embrace a metaphysics of thoughts and thinking similar to the standard Naive Russellian’s described above in the previous section. The difference between the views concerns whether or not the information semantically encoded by utterances of attitude reporting sentences is sensitive or insensitive to differences in the way a proposition is grasped.

Extra-linguistic context determines what way of grasping (what Crimmins and Perry call an idea) an utterance of a propositional attitude ascribing sentence makes implicit reference to. (On the most plausible version of the view, a type of way of grasping, instead of a token way of grasping, that is implicitly referred to.) The expressions themselves (and not just their referents or semantic contents) are, however, typically relevant to what way of grasping is implicitly referred to. So, although substitution of co-referring names does not affect the proposition the propositional attitude ascribing sentence claims the target of the report to have an attitude towards, as it does on the Fregean view, in some cases it affects what way of grasping is implicitly referred to and hence is capable of

affecting truth-value of a propositional attitude ascribing sentence. Greg Fitch also presented a similar view in his. We focus on Crimmins and Perry’s version, which is the most fully developed version of the view.)

RESULTS:

Crimmins and Perry offer a way of insisting that the objects of many of our attitudes are singular propositions while still denying the substitution principle. They can thus accept all of the auxiliary principles and claims used to generate Frege’s puzzle (i.e., Disquotation, Converse Disquotation, the principle of Rationality, etc.) and, like Frege, deny that the co-reference of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ licenses their inter-substitution in (1), while still claiming that ‘Superman’, as it occurs in (1), and ‘Clark Kent’, as it occurs in (2), are directly referential. The view seems to give us all that we could want: It respects our Fregean intuitions about truth-values without the sins of accepting a sense/reference distinction for singular terms like proper names, demonstratives, and indexicals.

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