NOVATEUR PUBLICATIONS
JournalNX- A Multidisciplinary Peer Reviewed Journal
ISSN No: 2581 - 4230
VOLUME 6, ISSUE 11, Nov. -2020

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR PRIVACY

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ABSTRACT:

This article will review the genesis of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" ("REP") requirement, both to establish the governing legal framework and to demonstrate how changing technology has altered our conception of the privacy in the past and describes the limits and ability of government agents to search for and seize evidence without a warrant. It is difficult to consider these questions or to develop their significance in isolation from the specific doctrinal issues beneath which they lurk. With the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine so limited, or even jettisoned altogether in favor of a dictionary definition of "search," courts can properly turn their focus to what intrusions are "reasonable." This Article concludes by examining four potential guideposts in this determination: the right to privacy, principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.

KEYWORDS: Telegraph messages and telephone conversations, reasonable, technology, regularity and consistency.

INTRODUCTION:

As stated in the OSCE Copenhagen Document 1990, "the rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression".

On July 2, 2019, the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted the first special law that regulates the protection of personal data. The Law, which comes into force on October 1, 2019, provides a variety of legal obligations for government agencies.

The main characteristic behalf criminal cases is that they are brought in the name of the government on behalf of the community. But while the presence of the state as a party is a feature of criminal cases, it is also a feature of many civil cases and of administrative proceedings brought by government agencies which are generally thought to be civil.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the Nlaw against such interference or attacks declares article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights

When government focuses its attention on crime detection and crime prevention, frequently it encounters uncooperative individuals. But the police are not compelled to forego investigative and preventive measures for lack of voluntary cooperation. They can exert themselves in order to gather information, evidence and suspects. When they do they must consider limitations imposed by the Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure. Implicit in this thesis to deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law in itself unconstitutional.

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR PRIVACY:

According to the Code of Criminal Procedure privacy of correspondence,

telegraph messages and telephone conversations shall be protected by law. Search, seizure, view of home or other premises and territories, belong to a person, arrest of the postal and telegraph correspondence and its seizure from the postal offices, tapping of telephones and of the other communication equipment, can be carried out only and in accordance with the procedure established by the Code. Tapping of telephone conversations, familiarization with communications, obtaining data about them, as well as other limitation of secrecy of conversations and communications is allowed only in cases and order, stipulated by law. For example, law enforcement bodies of Uzbekistan may obtain access to such conversations and communications during investigation of a crime.

The general rule is that right of the people mentioned above shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.

These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a virtual world. Where ever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. However courts had difficulty applying privacy regulations to modern investigative techniques.

However, those who commit crimes have not missed the information revolution. Criminals use electronic devises and network in the course of committing their crimes. For example, the net can be used to deliver a death threat by mail, for hacker attacks against a vulnerable computer network, to disseminate computer viruses, or to transmit images of child pornography. In other cases, computers merely function as convenient storage devices for evidence of crime.

Has the reasonable expectation of privacy test become outmoded in our technological advanced society where little of any information can be kept private? Has the electronic devise user legitimate expectation of privacy within the web addresses that he visits or the e-mail addresses to which he sends e-mail, as this information is accessible to his internet service provider?

REASONABLENESS AS PREDOMINANT CLAUSE:

Considering only whether a search is reasonable under the circumstances, as a unanimous Supreme Court stated in 2001, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests.

Reasonableness requires a court to compare the intrusion upon privacy with the government need. One element of government need could be termed "fungibility." If the same information is available via other less intrusive means, the greater intrusion is likely to be unreasonable. Thus, the fact that a low-cost, technologically enhanced search can obtain needed information should not itself be sufficient to render that search constitutional. Another logical element of government need is the magnitude of the crime at issue.

Technology will permit searches that may seem less intrusive but that obtain the same quantum of information-perhaps a scan by a passive millimeter wave camera rather than a full-body pat-down, or a single search of an extensive database rather than a significant background investigation. Including the magnitude of the alleged crime in the analysis may prevent courts from too freely authorizing intrusive conduct.

Professor Henderson argues that the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be dropped in favor of a test that evaluates every government invasion by whether it is reasonable under the circumstances in other words "technology will lead to no privacy and police practice will incorporate that technology to create a reality of no privacy.

According to Professor Grey courts constitutionally apply policy considerations not articulated in the text of the Constitution in the course of judicial review and the courts have a role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressly attributable to the Constitution.

It is undeniable that changing technology has altered our conception of privacy. Electronic mail has rapidly become a familiar form of communication, despite its potential insecurities. There are over 3.9 billion email users worldwide. In 2018, email users had an average of 1.75 email accounts. Over 293 billion emails are sent each day throughout the world. There are 1.3 billion Messenger users globally. More than 20 billion messages are exchanged between business and users monthly on Facebook Messenger.

Technology now enables voluminous important messages and confidential conversations to occur through an enormous system of electronic networks. These advances, however, raise significant privacy concerns. We are placed within the uncomfortable position of not knowing who might access to our personal and business e-mails, our medical and financial records, or our cordless and mobile phone conversations.

The Uzbekistan criminal procedure code provides for search and seizure of post and telegraph communications and wiretapping of telephone or other communications of persons under criminal investigation upon authorization by the prosecutor or a court (Articles 166-170).

Take all necessary measures to ensure that communications surveillance and collection of personal data in Uzbekistan conform to its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including article 17; in particular, measures should be taken to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.

RECOMMENDATION:

When investigating cases involving electronic data to what extent established exceptions are applicable to new technologies should be reconsidered one more time.

1. Consent which means that investigators may search object without a warrant if a person with authority has voluntarily consented to the search.
2. Implied Consent when individuals often enter into agreements with the government in which they waive some of their constitutional rights. For example, bank clerks may agree to be searched as a condition of employment, and visitors to buildings may agree to a search of their person and property as a condition of entrance. In a similar way, computer users may waive their rights to privacy as a condition of using the systems.
3. After the lawful arrest, agents may conduct a full search of the arrested person, and a more limited search of his surrounding area, without a warrant.
4. In order to protect the government's ability to monitor contraband and other property that may enter or exit illegally, the Code has recognized a special exception to the warrant requirement for searches that occur at the border. According to the law, routine searches at the border do not require a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable

suspicion that the search may uncover contraband or evidence.

5. Whereas private-sector employees enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy, government employees retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with in the workplace on condition that case-by-case inquiry shows that it is reasonable for employees to expect privacy. Whether a specific policy eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy could be a factual question.

Employment policies of many employers stated that the supervisors would inspect, and/or monitor Internet access and that such auditing would be implemented to support identification and prosecution of unauthorized activity.

In a common computer case, investigators learn of online criminal conduct. Using records obtained from a victim or from a service provider, investigators determine the Internet Protocol address used to commit the crime. Then investigators compel the Internet Service Provider to identify which of its customers was assigned that IP address at the relevant time, and to provide the user's name, street address, and other identifying information. In some cases, investigators confirm that the person named by the ISP permanent address. Such affidavits often sufficient to set up probable cause. However sometimes defendants may argue that the association of an IP address with address is insufficient to set up probable cause because it is possible for individuals not residing at that address and using Internet connection.

The programmatic purpose of a search may determine its constitutionality, meaning that for searches not based upon individualized suspicion and probable cause, the constitutionality of the search may depend upon its purpose."

As Harold Krent has argued, "the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information."

Thus, if police wish to conduct a technologically-enhanced search, the proposed uses of information so obtained should factor into the reasonableness inquiry.

While our privacy is surely invaded by government agents scanning persons or homes to prevent a terrorist attack or to protect a passing dignitary, it nonetheless might be more reasonable if they agree not to share that information with those pursuing ordinary law enforcement ends.

Unless external restraint, technology will lead to an expectation of no privacy, and police practice will incorporate that technology to create a reality of no privacy. Although legislation is always welcome in this area, and is crucial when it comes to protecting our privacy.

Coherent regulation of any power requires an integration of the terms in which the power is authorized and the terms by which it is limited; and an agency which controls some of the terms of limitation but none of the terms of authorization is generally likely to prefer mobility to consistency in its regulatory techniques. However, the degree to which mobility must be maintained and consistency must be sacrificed to maintain it depends upon the extent of variability that can be expected in the practices that the Court is called upon to regulate.

It is true, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, that "whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides.

On the one hand where guilt is not certain before the intrusion the police may be invading legitimate privacy and possessory interests of those who are actually innocent.

CONCLUSION:

Accordingly, investigators must consider two questons when requesting for

computer search and seizure warrant. First, does the search violate a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the search permissible within an exception to the warrant requirement? The privacy interest invaded must be one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable or legitimate.

Expectation of privacy would be determined by existing laws and practices and search must also be both "justified at its inception" and "permissible in its scope. Limited third party doctrine, requires police to avert their "technologically-enhanced" eyes from information otherwise provided. Programmatic purpose of a search may determine its constitutionality, meaning that for searches not based upon individualized suspicion and probable cause, the constitutionality of the search may depend upon its purpose. Accordingly, REP test and a limited third party doctrine provide protection for many technologically-enhanced searches. Considered our prospects for developing any generally effective control over police practices third party doctrine should be adopted to the intrusive capability of modern technology.

Sometimes criminal procedure presents a tension: the necessity to guard individual defendants and promote individual freedom is pitted against state interests in prosecuting crime and maintaining security. Expansion of judicial control over the inquiry and preliminary investigation within the framework of further expansion of the institution of "Habeas Corpus" based on best practices of foreign countries must become an effective means of ensuring protection of citizens' rights and freedoms from criminal encroachments, as well as avoiding violations of their legitimate interests.

The court has the final say in interpreting constitutional protections concerning privacy in criminal procedure, enhanced protection of constitutional rights through constitutional reliance, can provide greater protections of rights.

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